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The Multinational's Dilemma: The IBM
Proceeding in Europe
I. Introduction
Increased volume of international trade, availability of modern
communications, proliferation of the multinational enterprise, and
increased specialization on the part of industrial nations has created
a world of international economic interdependence. Unfortunately,
the legal, economic, and commercial systems confronted by the in-
ternational business community are neither interrelated nor uniform.
The rise in transnational activities has placed individuals and busi-
nesses in the midst of a conflict between the policies and laws of
different governments. The conflict results from a direct collision of
national goals being applied with equal force and vigor. Because
multinational corporations typically have contacts with subjects of
different nations, they are particularly affected by the problems aris-
ing from this conflict. One area in which this international conflict of
laws is most apparent is in the modern application of antitrust laws.'
Formerly, the United States was the only country with compre-
hensively developed antitrust legislation.2 Today, however, antitrust
is no longer an exclusively American concept. The significance of the
international market and the desire for free competition between
buyer and seller has forced major industrial democratic countries to
adopt antitrust legislation.3 In the last half century Japan,4 Ger-
many,5 and the European Economic Community' (EEC) have
adopted antitrust legislation similar to that enacted by the United
1. See Rubin, Multinational Enterprise and National Sovereignty: A Skeptic's Anal-
ysis, 3 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 1 (1971).
2. The United States antitrust statutes affecting foreign trade are the Sherman Act §§
1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982); the Clayton Act §§ 3, 7, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18, 22 (1982); the
Wilson Tariff Act §§ 73-76, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1982); the Webb-Pomerene Act §§ 1-4, 15
U.S.C. §§ 61-64 (1982).
3. See Note, Reciprocity: A Workable Standard For Foreign Government Antitrust
Standing?, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355 (1982).
4. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru horitsu [Act Con-
cerning Prohibition of Private Monopolies and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Law No. 54 of
1947. For a general discussion of the provision of the 1947 Act, see E. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN
JAPAN 121-24 (1970); H. IYORI, ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN JAPAN 13-16 (1969).
5. See Heil & Vorbrugg, Anti-Trust Law in West Germany: Recent Developments in
German and Common Market Regulation, 8 INT'L LAW. 349 (1974).
6. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. I (effective Jan. 1, 1958), reprinted in 1 COMM MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 100 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Treaty of Rome].
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States. This Comment will focus on the EEC's7 competition laws. 8
The EEC has enacted antitrust legislation which is no less ex-
tensive than United States antitrust laws. Like the United States,
the EEC seeks to assure unhindered operation of the free market.
Additionally, the EEC enactments are rigorously enforced, even
though enforcement mechanisms and antitrust philosophy may differ
from those of the United States." To the uncertainty created by the
lack of uniformity among antitrust laws is added the chauvinism of
many local lawmakers and jurists, both American and foreign. These
policymakers believe that their individual courts and administrative
bodies must exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to protect
the policy embodied in their respective antitrust laws.
The problematic application of foreign antitrust laws is a major
concern for American multinational corporations. This is especially
the case when the adversary includes a trading entity as valuable as
the EEC. There are two ways an American multinational corpora-
tion can engage EEC antitrust legislation. "First, there is the aspect
of direct economic activity within the Community through subsidiar-
ies and branches; second, there is the aspect of multinational activity
outside the Community which may be deemed to have an effect
within the Community."'
The effect of EEC antitrust legislation on American multina-
tional corporations is well illustrated by the recent IBM case.1' In
1980 the Commission of European Communities initiated proceed-
ings against IBM for alleged anticompetitive activities. Although the
case was ultimately settled, a few important questions remain unan-
swered. The most important question concerns the extent to which
the Treaty of Rome' 2 and principles of international fairness and
comity permit extraterritorial application of EEC antitrust laws.
This Comment will analyze the IBM case and then move into a dis-
cussion of both the extraterritorial application of antitrust legislation
in general and the international conflicts produced thereby. The
Comment will conclude that considerations of international fairness
and comity should have precluded assertion of jurisdiction by the
EEC over the IBM case.
7. West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark,
the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece are the members of the EEC.
8. Articles 85-94 of the Treaty are the competition rules. See Treaty of Rome, supra
note 6, at arts. 85-94.
9. See Samie, Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The British Re-
action, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 58 (1981-1983) [hereinafter cited as Samie].
10. Norton, The European Court of Justice Judgment in United Brands: Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction and Abuse of Dominant Position, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. POL. 379, 384 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Norton].
I1. 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 93 (1981), [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8708.
12. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 6, at art. 86.
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II. Background-IBM in the Common Market
IBM is the largest computer company in the world.13 In Europe
IBM is estimated to control two-thirds of the market for mainframe
computers"' and is the foremost supplier of mainframe computers in
practically every country. 5 The company's revenues in Europe for
1983 were ten billion dollars, a figure nearly equal to the sales of the
ten next largest companies combined.'" Much of IBM's success may
be attributed to the marketing approach it developed. IBM defined
the computer business broadly to serve a wide variety of customer
functions all in one package.' The company perceived its business
not as selling equipment, but as providing "data processing
systems."' 8
IBM encouraged its customers to rent rather than purchase its
equipment in order to avoid technological obsolescense. This
martketing strategy facilitated trade-ins because the consumer could
turn his old system in for a better and generally more costly new
system.' 9 The new systems were less expensive than the older sys-
tems on a performance/price basis and represented a savings to the
customer. Upgrading of a customer's computer system to a newer
system was profitable for IBM because customers used them more
extensively as performance and quality improved. 0
The original marketing approach developed by IBM advocated
free service, software, and consultancy to its customers for one hard-
ware2' rental charge.2 In the late 1960's, however, under threat of
antitrust prosecution, IBM began to charge separately for these
items. The company instituted a standard base contract for all
equipment. The basic rental charge covered use of the machine for a
specified number of hours per week. Additional use of the system
13. D. ABELL, DEFINING THE BUSINESS: THE STARTING POINT OF STRATEGIC PLAN-
NING 32 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABELL].
14. "Mainframe-There are at least three definitions: (1) A big computer, generally
priced above $150,000, that performs various sophisticated tasks. (2) The electronic guts of a
computer, including the central processing unit. (3) The mother computer in a computer net-
work." N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1984, at D14, col. 5.
15. "Its customers include numerous government departments and state-run industries,
as well as many of the leading privately owned corporations operating in Europe." DeJon-
quieres, IBM, E.C. Settle Competition Case, EUROPE (Sept.-Oct. 1984), at 18 [hereinafter
cited as DeJonquieres].
16. Id.
17. The IBM package included peripheral functions, central processing, software,
maintenance, emergency repairs, applications support, and consulting services to train custom-
ers' personnel. See ABELL, supra note 13, at 31.
18. Id. at 32.
19. Id. at 33.
20. Id.
21. "Hardware-The computer itself, including electronic circuits, terminal, keyboard,
and accessories." N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1984, at D14, col. 4.
22. ABELL, supra note 13, at 33.
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meant additional rental."
The story of plug-compatible manufacturer encroachment into
the peripheral 24 market and IBM's subsequent response can only be
understood by visualizing an electronic data processing system.2" The
system consists of several major devices known as hardware.2 6 The
most notable piece of hardware is the central processing unit
(CPU)." All other pieces of hardware are called peripherals. The
CPU performs calculations involved in the computer process after
receiving information from the peripherals.28 The entire computing
process is controlled by software, which tells the CPU and peripher-
als what to do. IBM produced and marketed the entire system. The
increase in the number of IBM customers created an expanded mar-
ket for peripheral devices.
The plug-compatible manufacturers (PCMs) focused on cus-
tomers willing to sacrifice the benefits of a systems purchase for per-
ipherals of equal or better quality and much lower prices.2 9 These
smaller competitors attacked IBM's hold on the computer industry
by defining their business much more narrowly. They developed and
marketed certain peripheral components which were directly adapta-
ble to IBM main computers.30 The initial introduction of PCM prod-
ucts did not cause great anxiety at IBM. Nonetheless, as announce-
ments of new PCM companies and products continued, the
resistance to using non-IBM peripheral equipment faded.31 Eventu-
ally, PCMs attained a profitable position in the peripheral market at
the expense of declining IBM sales in peripheral equipment.
IBM responded to the burgeoning competition from PCMs with
new corporate strategy designed to alter the situation to IBM's ad-
vantage. New programs forced PCMs to make price reductions and
to copy changing IBM products.32 General concern arose about the
long-term viability of PCMs in light of the aggressive position IBM
23. Id.
24. Peripheral equipment is any equipment that is not a central processing unit or a
control box. Id. at 57.
25. See generally Knox, New Developments in the Law of Monopoly: The Impact of
the IBM West Coast Cases, 14 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 309 (1984) (discussing makeup of a
computer system) [hereinafter cited as Knox].
26. See supra note 20.
27. "Central processing unit-The most important hardware inside a computer. As the
heart of the computer, it contains the electronic circuitry that does calculations, stores infor-
mation and operates various features including data and word processing." N.Y. Times, Aug.
3, 1984, at D14, col. 4.
28. See supra note 23.
29. ABELL, supra note 13, at 31.
30. Id. at 33.
31. Id. at 35. "In October 1969, the General Accounting Office of the Federal Govern-
ment released a study of PCM equipment. The study found that 'substantial savings are realiz-
able by purchasing peripheral equipment from independent manufacturers.' " Id.
32. Id. at 40-41.
[Vol. 3:2
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had taken. PCMs continued to announce new products and make
technical improvements in an effort to keep pace with increasing
IBM attempts to slow PCM advancement. In July 1972 IBM un-
veiled the SMASH program in a final effort to eliminate PCM com-
petition.3 3 This final series of maneuvers by IBM increased the com-
petitive pressure on PCMs to such an extent that the program might
have been successful in fully countering PCM competition. IBM's
strategy led to several private antitrust suits in the United States. 4
Contemporaneous with the IBM litigation in the United States,
the EEC directed a series of informal and formal investigations
against IBM."3 The EEC's concern arose out of complaints made by
various IBM rivals in the EEC computer market. Among the com-
petitors filing complaints were United States based manufacturers of
plug-compatible equipment including Amdahl and Memorex. 6 The
complaints concerned the legality of IBM business practices similar
to those litigated in United States courts.
In December 1980 the Commission of the European Communi-
ties informed IBM that it was initiating proceedings against IBM
under article 86 of the Treaty of Rome87 for exploiting its domina-
tion of the continent's computer business.3" The Commission alleged
that IBM had abused its dominant market position by engaging in
business practices designed to protect its position against PCMs.s9 In
33. Id. at 42-45. IBM cut prices on disc drives in order to price below competitor costs
and shifted controllers into the CPU in order to shield these units from competition.
34. The private United States antitrust cases include: Transamerica Computer Co. v.
IBM, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1983); Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981); California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM,
613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
35. ECC Commission Will Continue with Antitrust Case Against IBM, [Jan.-June]
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1064, at 1030 (May 13, 1982) [hereinafter cited
as EEC Commission].
36. Id.
37. Treaty of Rome, supra note 6, at art. 86. The text of article 86 reads as follows:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the com-
mon market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between .Member
States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other
unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trad-
ing parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to com-
mercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
38. IBM Corp. v. E.C. Comm'n, 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 93, 94 (1981), [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8708, at 8458.
39. Id.
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the statement of objections sent to IBM, four policies were cited as
constituting an abuse:
(a) failing not to offer System/370 0 central processing units
without the basic software included in the price;"1
(b) failing not to offer System/370 central processing units
without a main memory capacity being included in the
price;
(c) failing to supply other manufacturers in sufficient time
with the technical information needed to permit competing
products to be used with Systems/370;
42
(d) discriminating between users of IBM software: IBM re-
fused to supply certain software installation services to
users of non-IBM central processing units. 3
The charges made by the EEC were essentially the same as
those which were at issue in the United States." IBM subsequently
sought to have the EEC proceeding dismissed. In support of its ap-
plication IBM made three submissions,45 one of which is relevant to
this Comment. IBM submitted that the measures taken by the Com-
mission were illegal because they violated principles of international
law. IBM contended that the principle of international comity"
ought to be applied because the business practices in question were
already being challenged in the United States.' 7 Although the Com-
40. ABELL, supra note 13, at 34. The System/370 was IBM's largest product line dur-
ing the 1970's. It consisted of a series of compatible mainframe computers that let customers
buy larger or smaller models while using the same programs.
41. 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 93, 94 (1981), [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8708, at 8458. This technique is termed bundling. Bundling occurs when
one product is supplied with another at no separate price.
42. This is the interface issue. Interface is "[t]he equipment or program that allows
computers to communicate with one another." N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1984, at D14, col. 5.
43. 32 Common Mkt. L.R. 93, 94 (1981), [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8708, at 8458. See also EEC Commission, supra note 35, at 1031-1032.
44. See supra note 33.
45. 32 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 93, 95 (1981), [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 18708 at 8459.
46. International comity has been defined as follows:
International comity, comitas gentium, is a species of accommodation not
unrelated to morality but to be distinguished from it nevertheless. Neighbourli-
ness, mutual respect, and the friendly waiver of technicalities are involved, and
the practice is exemplified by the exemption of diplomatic envoys from customs
duties. Oppenheim writes of "the rules of politeness, convenience and goodwill
observed by States in their mutual intercourse without being legally bound by
them." Particular rules of comity, maintained over a long period, may develop
into rules of customary law.
Apart from the meaning just explained, the term "comity" is used in four
other ways: (1) as a synonym for international law; (2) as equivalent to private
international law (conflict of laws); (3) as a policy basis for, and a source of,
particular rules of conflict of laws; and (4) as the reason for and source of a rule
of international law.
I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (3d ed. 1979).
47. See generally Note, Comity and Computers in the Common Market: The IBM
Case, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. Bus. 626 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comity and Computers].
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mission's case extended only to IBM's operations in the EEC, the
extraterritorial application of its antitrust legislation would affect
IBM's business worldwide. Naturally this would lead to unfavorable
business repercussions in the United States.
III. Abuse of Dominant Position-Article 86
The antitrust law of the EEC is fundamentally different from
that of the United States. Free and unrestricted competition is not
the purpose of EEC law.48 The main purpose of the Treaty of Rome
is to promote harmonious development of economic activities
throughout the Community by establishing a common market. The
markets of member states are merged into a single European Com-
munity market with features similar to a domestic market. Competi-
tion policy plays a substantial part in the process.4 '
Competition rules of the EEC may be found in articles 85
through 94.50 Articles 85 and 86 are the most important. Article 85
pertains to restrictive business practices. Article 86 concerns the
abuse of a dominant position."' Essentially, article 86 is the EEC
prohibition of monopolization. It is not, however, an unqualified an-
timonopoly act. Prior to 1970 article 86 was a dormant provision of
the Treaty of Rome.52 The paucity of cases under this article may be
attributed to its ambiguous language. Article 86 states a general
principle using broad terms which are not defined by the Treaty.53
Not until the Commission's decision in Europemballage Corp. v.
Commission5" and the Court of Justice's subsequent judgment, did
the full potential of article 86 become apparent. Since 1973 there
have been several decisions which have expanded the use and mean-
ing of the article. Three of these proceedings have involved Ameri-
can multinationals: Continental Can, United Brands,55 and IBM.
A dominant firm violates article 86 when its actions interfere
48. See generally Jones, American Anti-Trust and EEC Competition Law in Compar-
ative Perspective, 90 LAW Q. REV. 191 (1974); Norton, Overview of European Community
Law: A Primer for Businessmen and Attorneys, 29 Sw. L.J. 347 (1975).
49. See Schlieder, European Competition Policy, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 647 (1982).
50. See supra note 8.
51. See supra note 37.
52. Norton, supra note 10, at 383. The Commission did not institute a proceeding
under article 86 before 1970.
53. See, e.g., Note, I COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2111, at 1676. ("Article 86 states
a general principle which must be implemented by the Council in order to become fully
applicable.").
54. For the judgment see Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. E.C.
Commission, 12 Common Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973), [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8171.
55. For the Commission's decision see U.S. Company Fined for Abuse of Dominant
Position, [1976-1978 Transfer Binder, New Developments] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1
9800. For the Court of Justice's judgment see United Brands Co. v. E.C. Commission, 21
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8429.
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with the objectives of an undistorted system of competition and are
likely to affect trade between member states.5" Article 86 prohibits
"any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or a substantial part of it . . .in so far
as it may affect trade between member states. '5 7 To infringe article
86, four elements are required: presence of a dominant position; oc-
cupation of a substantial part of the market; abuse of a dominant
position; and an effect on trade between member states.58 The inter-
pretation of these general concepts should be examined with respect
to IBM.
A. Dominant Position
Article 86 is silent as to what constitutes a dominant position.
Dominance may be less than a complete monopoly; but it must be
more than mere dominance in terms of market share.59 Since Conti-
nental Can, the primary emphasis has been on the overall indepen-
dence of behavior displayed by the firm being characterized as domi-
nant.60 Three factors must be examined to determine whether a firm
holds a dominant position: (1) the relevant product market; (2) the
relevant geographic market; and (3) the degree of economic strength
held by the firm.61
A relevant product market encompasses those products which
are clearly distinguishable from others in their particular features
and which are not reasonably interchangeable with others. In Conti-
nental Can, the Court of Justice for the European Community ruled
against the Commission concerning its interpretation of the relevant
product market.62 The Commission found that Continental Can held
56. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 6, at art. 3(f). Article 3(f) requires the institution
of a system designed to ensure that competition in the common market is not distorted.
57. See supra note 37.
58. These are the ambiguous terms which were attacked for uncertainty and lack of
specificity in Hoffman-LaRoche. See Hoffmann-LaRoche & Co. AG v. E.C. Comm'n, 26
Common Mkt. L.R. 211 (1979), [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1
8527.
59. See generally R. JOLIET, MONOPOLIZATION AND ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION
241 (1970); see also Note, European Economic Community Monopoly Law: Recent Trends in
the Application of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, 9 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 187 (1982)
(discussing interpretation of article 86) [hereinafter cited as EEC Monopoly Law].
60. Norton, supra note 10.
61. Id.
62. See Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 12 Common
Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973), [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8171.
Continental Can Company, New York, was the majority shareholder of Schmalbach-Lubeca
Werke AG (SLW), the leading German manufacturer of metal containers, and had a minority
interest in Thomassen and Drijver-Verblita (TDV), a Dutch corporation, which was the largest
producer of metal containers in the Benelux countries when it created a Delaware holding
company called Europemballage in 1970. Later, Continental Can transferred its shareholdings
in SLW and TDV. Europemballage made an offer to buy large amounts of TDV shares for
cash. It also stated that other leading European manufacturers of metal containers would pool
their respective interests and participate as shareholders in the company. The EEC Commis-
[Vol. 3:2
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a dominant position on the market for light metal containers for
canned meat and seafood and for metal closures for the food packing
industry.63 The Court criticized the Commission for failing to prop-
erly identify the relevant product market. In order to be a distinct
market, products or services must be considered by consumers to be
similar to one another by reason of their characteristics, price, or
use. The Commission's failure to distinguish the three markets as
separate precluded the Court from finding Continental Can in viola-
tion of article 86.0
In United Brands v. Commission66 the Commission argued that
the relevant market consisted solely of bananas. United Brands
maintained that the banana market was part of a general fruit mar-
ket, because bananas are reasonably interchangeable with other
types of fruit.6" The Court refused to concede that bananas are inter-
changeable with other fruits. The Court concluded that there was
only a small degree of interchangeability between bananas and other
fruits because there exists a relatively stable demand for bananas,
while the demand for general groups of fruit tends to fluctuate.6 7
The Court found that bananas as a whole were "sufficiently homoge-
neous and distinct from the market of other fresh fruits" to consti-
tute a relevant market.6 8
The IBM proceeding posed interesting questions concerning the
definition of the relevant market. IBM's presence in Europe is im-
mense. In 1983 the company employed in excess of 100,000 people
and garnered European revenues of 10 billion dollars. 69 More impor-
tantly, IBM has already installed a huge base of equipment in Eu-
rope. This allows IBM to control many of the industry standards. 70
At the proceeding, however, IBM stressed that it accounted for only
forty percent of all computer sales in Europe. The Commission, on
the other hand, contended that the relevant product market was nar-
rower. Common market officials alleged that IBM made sixty-five
percent of all mainframe sales in Europe and even more of IBM
sion objected to the consolidation because of incompatibility with article 86.
63. Id. at 226, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8171, at 8301.
64. Id. at 226-27, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8171, at 8301.
65. United Brands Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. 429(1978), [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429. United Brands (UBC) cut off
supplies to its distributor in Denmark because the distributor had started to deal in competing
products. UBC subsequently refused to supply the distributor with its products in an attempt
to enforce an exclusivity agreement.
66. Id. at 482, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7705.
67. Id. at 483, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8429, at 7706.
68. Id. at 484, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7706.
69. See supra note 15.
70. Industry standards are "the technical specifications that allow competing manufac-
turers to build peripheral devices compatible with IBM computers." N.Y. Times, July 11,
1984, at D2, col. 1.
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compatible mainframes.7 1 Essentially, the Commission promulgated
a market definition which was limited to IBM products, the large
mainframe computers.
The Commission's definition is a broad extension of the relevant
market definition espoused in United Brands. Obviously, IBM would
have a very large share in a market consisting of its own product.
IBM would maintain a perpetual dominant position. Under this par-
ticular market definition, a successful manufacturer doing business
in Western Europe will virtually always maintain a dominant posi-
tion. This unusual definition of the relevant market was not ad-
vanced in any of the cases brought in United States courts. 2
The relevant market determination requires an examination of
the relevant geographical area. Article 86 suggests that the domi-
nant position be within the common market or a substantial part of
it.73 The Court expressed this principle clearly in United Brands:
In order to determine whether UBC (United Brands Corpora-
tion) has a dominant position on the banana market it is neces-
sary to define this market both from the standpoint of the prod-
uct and from the geographic point of view. The opportunities for
competition under Article 86 of the Treaty must be considered
having regard to the particular features of the product in ques-
tion and with reference to a clearly defined geographic area in
which it is marketed and where the conditions of competition
are sufficiently homogeneous for the effect of the economic
power of the undertaking concerned to be able to be evaluated.
74
After the relevant product market is established, an analysis of
the economic position enjoyed by the firm is necessary. A dominant
position is determined by the degree of control a firm holds over the
product market.7 1 Initially, dominance in a market was assessed ac-
cording to the percentage of shares held in the market by the enter-
prise. 8 In United Brands, the Commission based its view that
United Brands had a dominant position on a number of considera-
71. EEC Commission, supra note 35, at 1031.
72. Baxter Urges EC Competition Officials Not to Force Interface Disclosures by
IBM, [Jan-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1050, at 278 (Feb. 4, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Baxter Urges EC Competition].
73. See supra note 37. Article 86 provides: "Any abuse . ..of a dominant position
within the common market or a substantial part of it ...."
74. United Brands Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429, 481 (1978), [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8429, at 7705.
75. See Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB--Grossmirkle
GmbH & Co. KG, 10 COMMON MKT. L.R. 631, 658 (1971), [1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8106, at 7193 ("[1]t is also necessary that the producer have,
alone or together with other enterprises in the same group, the ability to prevent effective
competition on an important part of the relevant market ....").
76. European Sugar Cartel: Co6perative Verenigning UA v. E.C. Comm'n, 17 Com-




tions. These consideration, when aggregated, gave United Brands a
permanent ascendancy over its competitors in Europe.7 The criteria
listed by the Court included: "[m]arket share, the firm's relative ac-
cess to the market, the number of competitors in the market and the
market shares held by them, the market structure of supply, and the
firm's access to capital or technological knowledge.
'78
When these factors are applied to IBM's position in Western
Europe a similar conclusion is obtained. Although estimates vary,
the company controlled at least forty percent of the European mar-
ket for data processing equipment. This percentage was even higher
when the proceedings began in 1980.7 In Western Europe's market
for large scale mainframe computers IBM's market share was
greater. Its percentage in that market was close to sixty-five per-
cent.80 IBM's access to capital and technological knowledge was the
principal issue concerning the EEC. The Commission contended that
IBM was eliminating competition by not releasing interface informa-
tion about new computers.81 Consequently, PCMs did not have an
opportunity to manufacture peripheral equipment in competition
with IBM.
The Court of Justice's holding in United Brands was significant
with respect to the Commission's decision to proceed with its action
against IBM. The United Brands's case expanded the scope of the
dominant position test. Until United Brands, the Court had not con-
cluded that an enterprise with a market share below fifty percent
was in a dominant position."' The Court based its decision on the
enterprise's overall economic strength within the market and re-
frained from employing a rigid application of the relevant market
theory.
The holding in United Brands displays an increased desire by
the EEC to avoid use of a concrete rule in determining a firm's posi-
tion in the relevant market. In United Brands, the Commission ex-
amined a variety of structural characteristics of both the market and
the firm to ascertain the degree of a firm's dominance over the mar-
ket. The factors examined included: UBC's "market share compared
with that of its competitors, the diversity of its sources of supply, the
homogenous nature of its product, the organization of its production
77. United Brands Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, 21 Common Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978), [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8429.
78. EEC Monopoly Law, supra note 59, at 187.
79. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1984, D2, col. 1.
80. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1984, D2, col. 2.
81. IBM Corp. v. Comm'n, Comm. Mkt. L.R. 93, 94 (1981), [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8708, at 8458.
82. See, e.g., EEC Monopoly Law, supra note 59, at 195. ("The Court... found the
existence of a dominant position in spite of the relatively low market share of forty-five percent
...')
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and transport, its marketing system and publicity campaigns, the di-
versified nature of its operations, and finally its vertical integra-
tion."' 83 By incorporating various factors, this test allows the Court
and Commission to act with greater flexibility in the application of
the term "dominant position."84
B. Abuse of a Dominant Position
Beyond the preliminary finding of a dominant position, article
86 requires that there be an abuse.85 Presence of a dominant position
is not itself prohibited. 86 What is prohibited is any abuse which in-
terferes with the objective of undistorted competition with the eco-
nomic life of the Community set forth in article 3(f).8 7 Four types of
general practices are described as abuses of a dominant position: Im-
posing unfair buying and selling prices or other unfair trading condi-
tions; limiting production, markets, or technical development to the
prejudice of the consumers; discriminating in commercial transac-
tions; and tying arrangements.88 The listing is illustrative and not
exhaustive of the abuses prohibited under article 86. Nonetheless,
the listing is broad enough to incorporate most activities which could
be deemed abusive.
An activity which falls within the article 86 classification will be
deemed abusive regardless of fault or intent. Except for General Mo-
tors v. Commission,89 the European Court of Justice has not treated
intent as important. Both the Continental Can judgment and Hoff-
man-La Roche9" establish that the test is whether behavior is objec-
tively contrary to the Treaty. One commentator has explained intent
as follows:
Intent is relevant only when the dominant firm did not
know and could not reasonably have known that its practice was
anti-competitive or exploitive, and when it corrected its error af-
ter it discovered it: if it knew or should have known of the anti-
competitive effects of what it was doing, any intent which the
83. United Brands Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429, 486 (1978), [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) V 8429, at 7707.
84. See EEC Monopoly Law, supra note 59, at 196.
85. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 6 at art. 86. Article 86 provides: "Any abuse by
one or more undertakings .... "
86. See, e.g.., Lang, Monopolisation and the Definition of "Abuse" of a Dominant
Position under Article 86 EEC Treaty, 16 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 345, 362 (1979) ("Com-
munity law does not object to the existence of a monopoly or dominant position . ) [here-
inafter cited as Lang].
87. See supra note 56.
88. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 6, at art. 86.
89. General Motors Continental N.V. v. E.C. Comm'n, 17 Common Mkt. L.R. 95
(1975), [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320.
90. Hoffmann-LaRoche & Co. A.G. v. E.C. Comm'n, 6 Common Mkt. L.R. 211
(1979), [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8527.
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law requires is sufficiently proved.9'
This rationale reflects the idea of fair, as opposed to free, competi-
tion and coincides with the Community's theory of effective
competition.
In IBM's reply to the Commission's statement of objections it
denied that it held a dominant position and that it committed any of
the alleged abuses.92 By the commencement of the formal EEC pro-
ceeding, IBM had already informed the Commission that company
policy was changing and two of the alleged abuses were in the pro-
cess of being remedied. IBM would supply software installation ser-
vices to users of non-IBM CPUs and would unbundle9" all it
software.94 This, however, was not enough. The Commission insisted
that IBM sell its System/370 computers separate from memory to
allow increased competition from common market suppliers.9 5 More
importantly, the Commission insisted on its demand that IBM pro-
vide European competitors with interface information.96
The interface information controversy concerned the timeliness
of IBM's new product disclosures. IBM usually announced new
products well in advance of the date the product were shipped. By
withholding technical information concerning plug-compatibility of
the computers until they were marketed, IBM placed their competi-
tors at a tremendous disadvantage. When IBM products reached Eu-
rope, the PCMs had to modify them in order to build printers, disc
drives, and other computer accessories which would be compatible
with IBM designs. Withholding interface information provided IBM
with a monopoly for a one- to two-year period immediately following
the launch of a new IBM product. 7
The Commission contended that the combination of IBM's early
announcements and the timing of its disclosure of specifications for
compatible equipment was an unfair exploitation of the company's
market dominance. By keeping these standards secret, IBM effec-
tively prohibited competitors from marketing compatible equipment
for a profit. The solution proposed by the Commission was unique.
IBM would disclose the interfaces on components at the time new
91. Lang, supra note 86, at 363 (emphasis in original).
92. IBM Changes Practices, Settles Dispute with EC Commission, [1984 New Devel-
opments] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 10,608 at 11,444.
93. See supra note 40.
94. See generally EEC Commission, supra note 35. Although IBM agreed to alter its
policy with regard to software bundling and availability of installation productivity options, the
company continued to argue that each practice was common to the industry.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Business Brief No. 1039, at 2 in EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INFORMATION SERVICE,
May 3, 1984 (copy on file with the Dickinson Journal of International Law). See supra text
accompanying notes 12-32. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 1984, D2, col. 2 (interface controversy
between IBM and PCMs).
Spring 1985]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
products were announced.9"
IBM argued that such design information was proprietary. The
company contended that the Commission's definition of interfaces
was too broad and that compliance with the EEC edict would result
in providing competitors with proprietary information concerning
computer design.99 According to the company, any publication of the
technical details of new equipment before the product came to the
market would stagnate IBM expansion and product innovation.
While the immediate result of this forced disclosure might benefit
the European computer industry, technological innovation would
subsequently decline. 100 IBM's competitors countered that the design
changes were merely "technical manipulation" which did nothing to
enhance performance of the computer.
IV. Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Legislation
It is settled law that a country can regulate conduct occurring
outside its territory which causes harmful results within its terri-
tory.' 0 ' The traditional example of this principle involves transna-
tional homicide: when a malefactor in state A shoots a victim across
the border in state B, state B can proscribe the harmful conduct.110
To take a more likely example, forging of United States Treasury
checks in a foreign country may certainly be controlled by the
United States.10 3
Extraterritorial application of antitrust laws met early resis-
tance in United States' courts. Neither the Sherman Act " nor its
legislative history gives any clear indication of the law's extraterrito-
rial effect. 0 5 In the landmark decision of American Banana v.
United Fruit Company,06 the Supreme Court declined to extend the
Sherman Act extraterritorially because it was unclear whether Con-
gress intended to Act to include conduct perpetuated beyond United
98. See generally Baxter Urges EC Competition, supra note 72, at 279. (Baxter stated
any order requiring IBM to disclose its computer software specifications would constitute
"quasi-confiscatorial" action.).
99. EEC Commission, supra note 35.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 18 comment c, illustration 2 (1965).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 496 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir. 1974).
104. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
105. See Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. COM. L. REv. 199 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kintner &
Griffin].
106. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In Banana,
United Fruit Company, an American corporation, persuaded Costa Rica to expropriate the
plaintiff's railroad equipment which was to be used in the plaintiff's own banana business. As a
result, the United Fruit Company was accused of monopolizing and restraining banana trade
between Central America and the United States. No effects on United States foreign com-
merce were alleged.
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States' borders. 10 7 The opinion exemplified a conservative territorial
doctrine which reflected judicial prudence and respect for interna-
tional boundaries.10 8 This limited interpretation of the Sherman Act
did not last. Two years after the Supreme Court's refusal to extend
the Act, the Court overturned American Banana in United States v.
American Tobacco Co.10 9
In American Tobacco, the Sherman Act was applied extraterri-
torially to agreements and contracts made by American and English
tobacco firms to divide world markets and eliminate competition be-
tween themselves. Unfortunately, the Court did not expressly ad-
dress the extraterritorial issue. The extraterritorial issue was not dis-
cussed until 1945.
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)" °, the
court formally departed from its previous adherence to a conserva-
tive territorial doctrine. The Alcoa case represents the extreme limit
to which courts have gone in the extraterritorial application of anti-
trust statutes."' Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court, con-
cluded that the Sherman Act reached conduct having consequences
within the United States if the conduct was intended to and actually
did have an effect upon United States imports or exports.1 2 Such
107. Id. at 357. Justice Holmes stated: "The foregoing considerations would lead in case
of doubt to a construction of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect
to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. [AJII legis-
lation is prima facie territorial." (quoting Ex parte Blain, In re Sowers, [1879] 12 Ch. D. 522,
at 528).
108. Id.
109. 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
110. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Ill. See Kintner & Griffin, supra note 105. See also Raymond, A New Look at the
Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 558 (1967) (development of Alcoa doctrine).
112. 148 F.2d at 443-44. Judge Hand stated:
That being so, the only question open is whether Congress intended to impose
the liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so; as a court
of the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law. Nevertheless, it is
quite true that we are not to read general words, such as those in this Act,
without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exer-
cise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to those fixed by the
"Conflict of Laws." We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all
whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the
United States . . . . On the other hand, it is settled law-as "Limited" itself
agrees-that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its bor-
ders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily
recognize . . . . It may be argued that this Act extends further. Two sitoations
are possible. There may be agreements made beyond our borders not intended to
affect imports, which do affect them, or which affect exports. Almost any limita-
tion of the supply of goods in Europe, for example, or in South America, may
have repercussions in the United States if there is trade between the two. Yet
when one considers the international complications likely to arise from an effort
in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that
Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them. Such agreements may
on the other hand intend to include imports into the United States, and yet it
may appear that they have had no effect upon them. That situation might be
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conduct could be prohibited even though the parties had no ties to
the United States.
In Alcoa, a foreign corporation which had been shipping alumi-
num to the United States was held in violation of the Sherman Act.
The court based its opinion on the fact that Alcoa made contracts
abroad which established a production quota for the aluminum pro-
duced by each contracting party. 113 This conduct affected United
States imports of aluminum by restricting sources of supply. The ef-
fect on United States imports gave the United States jurisdiction to
apply its statutes.
The effect on United States commerce test which arose from
Alcoa became the basis for extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction.'
1 4
Its popularity may be attributed to both the ease by which the ef-
fects test is satisfied, and the test's ability to transcend national mar-
kets in order to comport with the concept of the relevant market
theory.'
Although the Alcoa rationale has been applied religiously in
United States courts, 16 critics believe the holding is too broad.
Western Europeans argue for a narrower interpretation of extraterri-
torial antitrust jurisdiction, one which would prevent infringements
upon national sovereignty. 1 7 Later cases applying the effects test
thought to fall within the doctrine that intent may be a substitute for perform-
ance in the case of a contract made within the United States; or it might be
thought to fall within the doctrine that a statute should not be interpreted to
cover acts abroad which have no consequence here. We shall not choose between
these alternatives; but for argument we shall assume that the Act does not cover
agreements, even though intended to affect imports or exports, unless its per-
formance is shown actually to have had some effect upon them. Where both
conditions are satisfied, the situation certainly falls within such decisions as
United States v. Pacific & Artic R. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 33 S. Ct.
443, 57 L. Ed. 742; Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 676, 37 S. Ct. 353, 61 L. Ed.
597, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 322 and United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, 274
U.S. 268, 47 S. Ct. 592, 71 L. Ed. 1042. (United States v. Nord Deutcher
Lloyd, 223 U.S. 512, 32 S. Ct. 244, 56 L. Ed. 531, illustrates the same concep-
tion in another field). It is true that in those cases the persons held liable had
sent agents into the United States to perform part of the agreement; but an
agent is merely an animate means of executing his principal's purposes, and, for
the purposes of this case, he does not differ from an inanimate means; besides,
only human agents can import and sell ingot.
Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made
within the United States; and it follows from what we have just said that both
were unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and
did affect them.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. 148 F.2d 416.
114. See Grippando, Declining to Exercise Extraterritorial Antitrust Jurisdiction on
Grounds of International Comity: An Illegitimate Extension of the Judicial Abstention Doc-
trine, 23 VA, J. INT'L L. 395, 403 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Grippando].
115. Id. at 404.
116. See Shenefield, Extraterritoriality In Antitrust, 15 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 1109,
1113 (1983).
117. A number of states now have "blocking" legislation to frustrate or resist foreign
enforcement actions in their territories. These states include Canada, United Kingdom, Aus-
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have not only raised substantial concerns about fairness and comity
but have caused international protest.118
V. International Conflicts Precipitated by Extraterritorial Enforce-
ment of American Antitrust Laws
There were no serious international repercussions from the Al-
coa decision. Nevertheless, it has served as precedent for extreme
applications of United States antitrust law. Extraterritorial enforce-
ment of United States antitrust laws has produced numerous con-
flicts with major United States trading partners, especially the
United Kingdom. Governments consider such extraterritorial en-
forcement to be an infringement on their sovereignty.'1 9 The most
famous case in this area is United States v. Imperial Chemical In-
dustries, Ltd. 20 The litigation concerned agreements entered into by
DuPont and I.C.I., a British corporation. The United States District
Court held that DuPont and I.C.I. violated the Sherman Antitrust
Act by contracting to divide up the world for the purpose of market-
ing nylon. The court ordered a cancellation of patent assignments to
I.C.I. by DuPont, which were made pursuant to the contract. This
order negated the exclusive nature of rights secured by British Nylon
Spinners (BNS) in a later agreement with I.C.I."2I The contract be-
tween I.C.I. and B.N.S. was legal and enforceable in England where
it was made and performed.' 22
The American order created three problems: (1) it deprived
BNS, a company not within the jurisdiction of an American court, of
a right legally contracted for; (2) it forced BNS to bring suit to chal-
lenge the American order; and (3) it placed I.C.I. in a position of
undue hardship. In complying with the order of the United States
court, I.C.I. invited legal action on the part of BNS. BNS brought
tralia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Switzerland, and West Germany.
For a discussion of foreign reaction to the "effects" test see Griffin, American Antitrust Law
and Foreign Governments, 13 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 137 (1978); Samie, supra note 9.
118. See Silkin, The Perspective of the Attorney General of England and Wales, in
PERSPECTIVES ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER
LAws 31-32 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
119. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 94
(H.L. 1977). For a discussion of the proceedings, see Note, Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation v.
Westinghouse Electric Corporation: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Antitrust Matters, 5
MONASH U.L. REV. 76 (1978).
120. 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
121. Id. at 228. The court stated:
[A]cting on the basis of our jurisdiction in personam, we are merely directing
ICI to refrain from asserting rights which it may have in Britain, since enforce-
ment of those rights will serve to continue the effects of wrongful acts it has
committed within the United States affecting the foreign trade of the United
States.
Id.
122. See Note, English Contracts and American Anti-Trust Law: The Nylon Patent
Case, 18 MoD. L. REV. 65 (1955).
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suit and obtained an injunction stopping I.C.I. from parting with the
British patents. 12  An escape clause in the order allowed I.C.I. to
reconcile the conflicting orders and perform its contract with
BNS. 124 The American order had forced I.C.I. to violate a contract
with another not subject to the United States court's jurisdiction.
The United States was heavily criticized for its actions.
Another early case involving the extraterritorial enforcement of
antitrust provisions against foreign defendants abroad was United
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.
12 5
Here a convention among the various elements of the Swiss watch
and watchparts manufacturing industry regulated the sale of
watches, watch parts, and machinery. These agreements were ap-
proved by the Swiss Government. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York found that the convention
and contracts made under it violated the Sherman Act because they
were intended to and did affect United States markets. The court
subsequently issued injunctions against the two main Swiss associa-
tions of watchmakers and against Swiss entities that had never been
served in the case. The decree ordered termination of all agreements
affecting world trade with the United States. Following direct inter-
vention by the Swiss Government1 26 and the United States Depart-
ments of State and Justice, the court modified its order to affect only
Swiss agreements with United States distributors. The most notable
aspect of the district court's decision was that it expanded the "in-
tended effects" test doctrine of the Alcoa decision into a pure effects
approach, without any regard to actual intent. Actions could be pro-
hibited as long as they had a "substantial" effect on United States
commerce. 127
VI. American Response to Criticism of the Effects Doctrine
United States courts interpret the effects doctrine more broadly
123. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19
(1952).
124. See British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., [1955] 1 Ch. 37,
49 (1954) (quoting United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., art IV, 11 3, No. 24-13
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1952) ("No provision of this judgment shall operate against I.C.I. for
action taken in compliance with any law . . . of any foreign government or instrumentality
thereof, to which I.C.I. is at the time being subject."). The sovereign compulsion defense oper-
ates to avoid liability when the defendant's activities abroad are required by foreign law.
125. 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
126. The Swiss Government threatened to bring the matter before the International
Court of Justice. See J. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST OVERLAP AND
CONFLICT 334 (1970).
127. Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities Law, 28
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 575, 582 (1979). See also United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzer-
land Information Center, Inc., (1963) Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 at 77,457 ("[A] United
States court may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and contracts abroad, if . . . such acts and
contracts have a substantial and material effect upon our foreign and domestic commerce.").
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than most foreign countries would consider permissible.128 Although
the effects doctrine conforms to the objective territorial principle of
jurisdiction permitted under international law, 129 and is codified in
the national legislation of several European states' 30 as well as in a
European Economic Community Convention, 13  there has been an
attempt by the United States to modify the effects doctrine in recent
years. United States courts have adopted a balancing approach
through which principles of international comity s2 are considered in
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws.
Since the decision in Alcoa, many commentators have recom-
mended that a conflict of laws approach be used in order to elimi-
nate international friction.'" In Timberlane v. Bank of America,'"
the Ninth Circuit adopted this approach. Timberlane, an Oregon
lumber company, established two new companies in Honduras to ex-
port lumber to its United States operations. The Bank of America
Corporation, through a wholly owned subsidiary, had large financial
interests in three Honduran mills. One of these mills was forced to
dissolve because of financial difficulty. Timberlane purchased this
third plant and reactivated the mill. The mill now competed directly
with the other two Bank America plants. The Bank refused
Timberlane's efforts to quiet title and through its agent obtained em-
bargoes on the properties of Timberlane's companies in Honduras,
ostensibly to prevent the diminution in available assets from which
the Bank's claim might be satisfied. In federal court Timberlane con-
tended that this act affected commerce in violation of the antitrust
laws.1
3 5
The Ninth Circuit refused to apply or reaffirm an inflexible and
all encompassing rule. The court noted that the effects test by itself
128. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
129. "The objective territorial principle supports the exercise of jurisdiction by a state
where a constituent element of the offense has taken place within that state's territory."
Triggs, Extraterritorial Reach of United States Anti-Trust Legislation: the International Law
Implications of the Westinghouse Allegations of a Uranium Producers' Cartel, 12 MELB. U.L.
REV. 250, 261 (1979).
130. See, e.g., Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrfi kongen, [1957] BUNDESGESETZBLATT,
TElL I [BGBI] 1081 (W. Ger. July 27), republished [1974] BGBI.I 869 (Apr. 4), amended,
Law of June 28, 1976 [19761 BGBI.I 1697 (West Germany's law against restraint of trade).
By its terms this law "applies to all restraints of competition effective in the area of applicabil-
ity of the law, even if they result from acts done outside the area." Id.
131. The Court of Justice for the EEC has interpreted article 85(1) of the Treaty of
Rome as embodying the economic effects doctrine. See, e.g., Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd. v.
E.C. Commission, I I Common Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972), [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161.
132. See supra note 45.
133. See Antitrust-Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the Effects Doctrine-A Con-
flicts Approach, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 354, 357 (1977).
134. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Timberlane, see Ongman, "Be
No Longer Chaos". Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Scope, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 733 (1977).
135. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 601.
Spring 19851
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interests. 13 6
The court concluded that a three-part analysis should be applied for
all cases involving the extraterritorial reach of antitrust laws. The
first test addresses whether the alleged restraint affects, or was in-
tended to affect, United States commerce. The second test concerns
whether the activity in question is of a type which would violate the
Sherman Act. The third test considers whether extraterritorial juris-
diction should be extended in view of principles of international com-
ity and fairness. By consolidating its analysis into a single jurisdic-
tional equation, the Timberlane court purported to create a
"jurisdictional rule of reason.
s13 7
The comity question is the most complicated. The first two tests
determine whether a court can assert jurisdiction and whether a
claim exists. Test three attempts to remedy the possibility of overex-
tension and the resulting conflict with foreign nations by examining
whether jurisdiction should be asserted once it has been recognized.
To insure that competing interests of nations are considered, Judge
Choy, writing for the court, set forth the following criteria:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the locations or principal places of business corporations,
the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected
to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.1
38
The standards promulgated by Judge Choy were not new. In
fact, the basic text of the court's criteria was a combination of bor-
rowings from section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States'3 9 and Kingman Brewster.
140
The court's contribution lies in making these comity considerations a
fundamental step in the analysis of whether jurisdiction should be
asserted in an international antitrust case.
The balancing process adopted by the Ninth Circuit to deter-
mine whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised was
later employed by the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills v. Con-
136. Id. at 611-12.
137. Id. at 613, citing K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 286
(1958) [hereinafter cited as BREWSTER].
138. Id. at 614.
139. Section 40 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (1965) lists the following:
(a) vital national interest of each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature of
the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the per-
son, (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory
of the other state, (d) the nationality of the other person and (e) the extent to
which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to
achieve compliance, with the rule prescribed by that state.
140. See BREWSTER, supra note 137 at 339.
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goleum Corp. 1" The Mannington Mills court formulated a new ju-
risdictional test. The test permits a court which has subject matter
jurisdiction to abstain from exercising such jurisdiction in the inter-
est of international comity.
The Third Circuit's test is comprised of two parts: (1) whether
jurisdiction exists according to the "effects" test, and (2) once juris-
diction is found to exist, whether it should exercise jurisdiction based
upon an assessment of international comity considerations." 2 The
distinction between Timberlane and Mannington Mills is that the
Timberlane court construed section 40 of the Restatement (Second)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States to mean that
extraterritorial jurisdiction may exist only if permitted by interna-
tional comity. The Mannington Mills court, on the other hand, sug-
gests that jurisdiction may exist before international comity is con-
sidered but may be negated by principles of international comity." 3
Relying on the balancing process promulgated in Timberlane, the
Third Circuit proposed various comity factors to be weighed in de-
termining whether jurisdiction should be exercised."" The court es-
poused a doctrine of discretionary jurisdiction grounded upon inter-
national comity considerations. "Accordingly, after finding
jurisdiction existed, the court remanded the case in order to allow
the district court either to abstain or accept jurisdiction upon further
evaluation of the comity factors relevant to the abstention choice.""
The Mannington Mills court has thus suggested that international
comity is an abstention doctrine in the realm of international law."1
6
VII. Extraterritorial Application of EEC Law
The Commission's power to apply EEC competition law to for-
eign based companies may be derived directly from the language of
articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. References to "effect"
between member states or within the common market provide an ex-
plicit source for employment of an "effects" doctrine for extraterrito-
rial application of antitrust laws." 7 The wording of the statute re-
sembles American formulations of the effects doctrine. In fact the
institutions of the EEC have taken a stance that is nearly identical
141. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). Mannington Mills, an American vinyl floor pro-
ducer, charged that Congoleum had fraudulently procured patents in certain countries to ex-
clude Mannington Mills from those markets in violation of the Sherman Act.
142. Id. at 1291-92.
143. Note, Antitrust Law-Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-Court Must Consider Inter-
national Comity in Exercising Jurisdiction Under Sherman Act, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J.
185, 196 (1980) [hereinafter cited as SUFFOLK].
144. 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
145. See Grippando, supra note 114, at 409.
146. Id.; see also SUFFOLK, supra note 143.
147. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 6, at art. 86.
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to that adopted in the United States. In Bequelin Import Co. v. G.L.
Import Exports,48 the European Court of Justice demonstrated that
it was willing to expand jurisdiction to activities outside the Commu-
nity. The Court noted in dicta that "the fact that one of the under-
takings participating in the agreement is situated in a nonmember
country is no obstacle to that application of that provision, so long as
the agreement produces its effects in the territory of the Common
Market." 49 The Bequelin decision suggests that the EEC does not
consider itself to be bound by a strict territorial application of its
own antitrust laws.
In a series of cases known as the Dyestuffs cases, 150 the EEC for
the first time made a decision to enforce jurisdiction over antitrust
conduct occurring wholly outside the common market. The Commis-
sion fined nine companies for their role in a price-fixing scheme in-
volving the entire dyestuffs market. Three of the nine companies
charged with violating article 85 were not within the common mar-
ket.' The Commission ruled that:
The competition rules of the Treaty are consequently, applicable
to all restrictions of competition which produce within the Com-
mon Market effects set out in Article 85(1). There is, therefore,
no need to examine whether the undertakings which are the
cause of these restrictions of competition have their seat within
or outside the Community.' 52
Although the Commission based its jurisdiction over non-EEC
companies on the "effects" doctrine, the Court of Justice declined to
acknowledge it as the source of jurisdiction. The Court of Justice
provided an alternative argument to support jurisdiction-the single
enterprise theory. 153 Under the single enterprise theory, acts of for-
eign companies' subsidiaries located within the common market are
imputed to the parent because the subsidiaries are deemed to be part
of the parent. 54
148. Bequelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Exports S.A., 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 81
(1972), [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8149.
149. Id. at 95, COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8149, at 7704.
150. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n, 11 Common L.R. 557 (1972), [1971-
1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) V 8161. For a discussion of the cases see
Note, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Legislation in The Common Market: The
Dyestuffs Cases, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 169 (1973) [hereinafter cited as The Dyestuffs
Cases].
151. Imperial Chemical Industries was domiciled in Great Britain; Giegy and Sandoz
were domiciled in Switzerland.
152. Commission Decision of July 24, 1968, 8 Common Mkt. L.R. at D-33 (1969).
153. Imperial Chemical Indus. Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557, 593
(1972), [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8161, at 8031.
154. Id.
If the subsidiary does not in fact have autonomy in determining its course of
conduct on the market, the prohibition of Article 85, paragraph 1, is inapplica-
ble to the relationship between it and the parent company, with which it forms
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The opinion of the European Court of Justice is curious in that
it does not reject the American concept of the "effects" doctrine. It
simply ignores it. This is attributable to the Court's fear that to
adopt any decision involving the concept of "effect" would establish
a dangerously broad interpretation of the theory. The single eco-
nomic unit theory still allows the Commission to reach foreign based
conduct. Because the single economic unity test still results in an
extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction, all comity issues relevant to
the use of the effects test remains with the single economic unit
theory.
VIII. The Role of Comity in the IBM Case
Although the EEC and IBM reached a settlement in August
1984,1" the EEC antitrust proceeding against IBM serves to illus-
trate the uncertainty and lack of uniformity confronting a multina-
tional enterprise operating in international markets. The proceeding
also illustrates the Commission's willingness to disregard comity con-
siderations which would appear to have precluded the Commission's
assertion of jurisdiction over IBM.
Comity is an elusive concept. 56 According to IBM, comity is
the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another sov-
ereign.15 7 More precisely, comity is a necessary outgrowth of our in-
ternational system of interdependent nation states. Just as people
and products move freely between countries, so national interests
also cross territorial borders. But no nation can expect its laws to
reach further than its jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and en-
force those laws. 58 There is no definitive list of criteria provided by
the United States to address the comity issue present in IBM. The
main sources, Timberlane, Mannington Mills, and the Restatement
(Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States are sim-
ilar. Each requires a balancing test which relies on a list of contacts
to be evaluated and weighed against those of the foreign country.
an economic unity. Since an affiliated group so structured forms a unity, the
parent company can, under certain circumstances, be held responsible for the
actions of the subsidiary ....
Under these circumstances, the separation between parent firm subsidiaries
arising out of the fact that each has a distinct legal personality does not prevent
their conduct on the market from being viewed as a unity for purposes of the
application of the rules of competition. For this reason, it is the plaintiff that
brought about the concerted practice within the Common Market.
155. See generally The Community v. IBM, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 147 (1984); IBM
Changes Practices, Settles Dispute with E.C. Commission, [1984 New Developments] COM-
MON MKT. RaP. (CCH) 1 10608 (text concerning undertaking agreed to between IBM and the
E.C. Commission).
156. See supra note 46.
157. See Comity and Computers, supra note 47, at 628.
158. See supra note 46.
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An initial evaluation of comity considerations requires determi-
nation of the locus of the conduct and the nationality of the parties.
With regard to the first consideration, the operative decisions to en-
gage in the alleged anticompetitive activities were made in IBM's
corporate headquarters in the United States. Consequently, the al-
leged anticompetitive activities had their origin in the United States
although some of the effects were manifest in Europe. It is important
to note at this point that most of the issues raised by the EEC had
already been litigated in the United States.
With regard to the second consideration, it is clear that IBM is
a United States corporation. The fact that the EEC ultimately initi-
ated the proceeding gives the affair a decidedly international charac-
ter. Nevertheless, this distinction between nationalities is weakened
when the whole picture is viewed. The proceeding was prompted, in
part, by complaints which were filed by other American compa-
nies-companies which had already had an opportunity to press
their claims in United States courts. In fact, Memorex S.A., an affil-
iate of Memorex, was permitted to intervene in the EEC proceeding
in support of the Commission. Memorex had also brought suit in the
United States on similar issues.159 The IBM proceeding in Europe
evolved into a second forum for American plaintiffs who lost in
United States courts.
60
Equally important is the consideration that any sanction im-
posed by the EEC, although ostensibly applied solely to IBM's con-
duct within Europe, would have significant repercussions in America.
For example, in Memorex Corp. v. IBM,' the district court held
IBM's practice of withholding interface design changes upon an-
nouncement of a new product did not violate American antitrust
laws."" The court reasoned that PCMs were able to compete with
IBM under such circumstances.6 3 In fact, the court concluded that
competition was improving because the PCMs were producing better
products in less time and that forcing IBM to disclose interface de-
sign early would hinder its drive for technological improvement." 4
An EEC order forcing IBM to release interface information
would result in the EEC redefining American business practices
159. Memorex v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 972 (1981).
160. See generally Comity and Computers, supra note 47; Causes and Solutions to
International Disputes are Assessed by Former Antitrust Official, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1014, AA-1, at AA-6-7 (May 14, 1981) ("[Olne can see the
[IBM] case as a kind of second chance-i.e., American plaintiffs losing a case in the U.S.,
taking another shot at it by becoming complainants in the Common Market.").
161. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), afd, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
162. California Computer Prods. v. IBM, 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979).




which had already been judicially sanctioned." 5 It would appear
that an EEC determination opposed to IBM would have a greater
effect on American commerce than it would have on the beneficial
promotion of competition in Europe.
In light of the foregoing analysis, it appears that considerations
of comity should have precluded the EEC's assertion of jurisdiction
over the case. The matters had already been litigated in the United
States and decided in IBM's favor. The EEC case could have served
to subvert the American court decisions by giving the plaintiffs a
second crack at IBM. Moreover, an EEC order compelling broad
disclosure of technical information would have contravened the
American courts' rulings that such disclosure was not required. In-
deed, American courts had determined that mandatory disclosure
would have a negative rather than a positive effect on competition.
IX. Conclusion
Although considerations of comity alone may have dictated that
the EEC refrain from exercising jurisdiction, the doctrine of comity
is not applied in a vacuum. Nor is it a mandatory rule of law. Politi-
cal pressures and considerations play a large role in such determina-
tions. Judicial deference to a foreign interest may usurp the legisla-
tive function. The EEC's decision to exercise jurisdiction was
undoubtedly based, in part, on its determination to vindicate the
Treaty of Rome and the policies contained therein. Furthermore, the
doctrine of comity is not a mandatory rule of law. Even in the
United States, where the rationale originated, courts increasingly re-
fuse to adopt it. 66
Similarly, economic and political pressures led to the IBM set-
tlement. Europeans feared IBM might cease making investments in
Europe if the EEC imposed its sanctions. 1 7 It is unlikely that IBM
would have totally abandoned Europe because European sales ac-
count for thirty percent of its overall revenues. Nevertheless, the
Europeans could not withstand the threat of an IBM decision to stop
expanding its operations on the continent. This concern is attributa-
ble to IBM's position as a major source of employment and techno-
logical innovation.1 68
The settlement, upon first glance, appears -to have given the
EEC significant concessions from IBM. IBM agreed to disclose suffi-
165. See supra note 34.
166. See National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Assoc., 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir.
1981); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
167. See, e.g., EC Suspends Antitrust Proceeding: IBM Will Disclose New Product
Data Sooner, [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1177, at 272 (Aug. 9,
1984) [hereinafter cited as EC Suspends Proceedings].
168. Id.
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cient information to allow competitors to connect hardware and
software products to System/370. 6 9 IBM also agreed to disclose ad-
equate and timely information to competitors to enable them to con-
nect their systems with IBM's System/370 using Systems Network
Architecture.
1 70
Most experts feel that the information which IBM is providing
will not aid European manufacturers seeking a larger share of the
market.17 1 Nor will the release of information slow IBM's growth in
Europe. In fact, some feel that if the agreement helps anyone, it may
be the Japanese who are the main manufacturers of IBM compatible
computers. 7 1
William F. Colby, Jr.
169. IBM Changes Practices, Settles Dispute With EC Commission, [1984 Develop-
ments] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10608, at 11,447-48.
170. Id. at 11,447.
171. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1984, at D14, col. 1. But see ECSuspends Proceed-
ings, supra note 167.
172. See generally Pollock, Settlement Between IBM and Common Market Assessed,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 1984, at D2, col. 1.
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